Attachment 732617 Details for Bug 1025084

[patch] sle11-sp3.patch

sle11-sp3.patch (text/plain), 10.01 KB, created by Stefan Dirsch on 2017-07-17 14:49:10 UTC

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Creator: Stefan Dirsch

Created: 2017-07-17 14:49:10 UTC

Size: 10.01 KB

patch

obsolete

>Index: xorg-x11-server.changes
>===================================================================
>--- xorg-x11-server.changes	(revision 4)
>+++ xorg-x11-server.changes	(working copy)
>@@ -1,3 +1,19 @@
>+-------------------------------------------------------------------
>+Mon Jul 17 13:43:13 UTC 2017 - sndirsch@suse.com
>+
>+- u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch 
>+  If arc4random_buf() is not available for generating cookies:
>+  * use getentropy(), if available (which was only recently added to
>+    glibc)
>+  * use getrandom() via syscall(), if available (there was no glibc
>+    wrapper for this syscall for a long time)
>+  * if all else fails, directly read from /dev/urandom as before, but
>+    employ O_CLOEXEC, do an OsAbort() in case the random data couldn't be
>+    read to avoid unsecure situations. Don't know if that's too hard a
>+    measure but it shouldn't actually occur except on maximum number of
>+    FDs reached
>+  (bsc#1025084)
>+
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> Sun Jun 11 06:59:30 UTC 2017 - sndirsch@suse.com
> 
>Index: xorg-x11-server.spec
>===================================================================
>--- xorg-x11-server.spec	(revision 4)
>+++ xorg-x11-server.spec	(working copy)
>@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@
> Patch1001:      U_os-use-timingsafe_memcmp-to-compare-MIT-MAGIC-COOKIES.patch
> Patch1002:      U_os-use-arc4random_buf-if-available-to-generate-cookies.patch
> Patch1003:      U_os-brown-bag-commit-to-fix-957e8d.patch
>+Patch1004:      u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch
> 
> %description
> This package contains the X.Org Server.
>@@ -532,6 +533,7 @@
> %patch1001 -p1
> %patch1002 -p1
> %patch1003 -p1
>+%patch1004 -p1
> 
> %build
> pushd xorg-docs-*
>Index: u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch
>===================================================================
>--- u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch	(revision 0)
>+++ u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch	(working copy)
>@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
>+From 44a643812ce3c07cd38972abfa9dbd163529c192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>+From: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
>+Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 14:58:04 +0200
>+Subject: [PATCH] Use better fallbacks to generate cookies if arc4random_buf(3)
>+ is unavailable
>+References: bsc#1025084
>+
>+If arc4random_buf() is not available for generating cookies:
>+
>+- use getentropy(), if available (which was only recently added to
>+  glibc)
>+- use getrandom() via syscall(), if available (there was no glibc
>+  wrapper for this syscall for a long time)
>+- if all else fails, directly read from /dev/urandom as before, but
>+  employ O_CLOEXEC, do an OsAbort() in case the random data couldn't be
>+  read to avoid unsecure situations. Don't know if that's too hard a
>+  measure but it shouldn't actually occur except on maximum number of
>+  FDs reached
>+
>+Reviewed-by: Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.de>
>+---
>+ configure.ac            |   4 +-
>+ include/dix-config.h.in |   6 +++
>+ os/auth.c               | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>+ 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>+
>+Index: xorg-server-1.6.5/configure.ac
>+===================================================================
>+--- xorg-server-1.6.5.orig/configure.ac
>++++ xorg-server-1.6.5/configure.ac
>+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(XSERVER_DTRACE, [test "x$
>+ 
>+ AC_HEADER_DIRENT
>+ AC_HEADER_STDC
>+-AC_CHECK_HEADERS([fcntl.h stdlib.h string.h unistd.h])
>++AC_CHECK_HEADERS([fcntl.h stdlib.h string.h unistd.h sys/syscall.h])
>+ 
>+ dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
>+ AC_C_CONST
>+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([geteuid getuid link memm
>+ 		getisax getzoneid shmctl64 strcasestr ffs])
>+ AC_REPLACE_FUNCS([timingsafe_memcmp])
>+ AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [arc4random_buf])
>+-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf])
>++AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf getentropy])
>+ AC_FUNC_ALLOCA
>+ dnl Old HAS_* names used in os/*.c.
>+ AC_CHECK_FUNC([getdtablesize],
>+Index: xorg-server-1.6.5/include/dix-config.h.in
>+===================================================================
>+--- xorg-server-1.6.5.orig/include/dix-config.h.in
>++++ xorg-server-1.6.5/include/dix-config.h.in
>+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@
>+ /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
>+ #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
>+ 
>++/* Define to 1 if you have the `getentropy' function. */
>++#undef HAVE_GETENTROPY
>++
>+ /* Define to use libmd SHA1 functions instead of OpenSSL libcrypto */
>+ #undef HAVE_SHA1_IN_LIBMD
>+ 
>+@@ -213,6 +216,9 @@
>+ /* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/vm86.h> header file. */
>+ #undef HAVE_SYS_VM86_H
>+ 
>++/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/syscall.h> header file. */
>++#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H
>++
>+ /* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_memcmp' function. */
>+ #undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_MEMCMP
>+ 
>+Index: xorg-server-1.6.5/os/auth.c
>+===================================================================
>+--- xorg-server-1.6.5.orig/os/auth.c
>++++ xorg-server-1.6.5/os/auth.c
>+@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ from The Open Group.
>+ #ifdef HAVE_LIBBSD
>+ #include   <bsd/stdlib.h>       /* for arc4random_buf() */
>+ #endif
>++#include   <errno.h>
>++#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H
>++#include   <syscall.h>
>++#endif
>+ 
>+ struct protocol {
>+     unsigned short   name_length;
>+@@ -316,18 +320,141 @@ GenerateAuthorization(
>+     return -1;
>+ }
>+ 
>++#if ! defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF)
>++
>++// fallback function to get random data directly from /dev/urandom
>++
>++static int
>++GetUrandom ( char *buffer, size_t length )
>++{
>++    int random_fd = -1;
>++    int res = -1;
>++    size_t filled = 0;
>++
>++    // larger requests are typically rejected by getentropy() / getrandom()
>++    // because they could block or return partially filled buffers
>++    if( length > 256 ) {
>++        errno = EIO;
>++        return -1;
>++    }
>++
>++    random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
>++
>++    if( random_fd == -1 ) {
>++        return -1;
>++    }
>++
>++    while( filled < length ) {
>++        res = read(random_fd, (char*)buffer + filled, length - filled);
>++
>++        if( res == -1 ) {
>++            // shouldn't actually happen acc. to man(4) random,
>++            // but you never know
>++            if( errno == EINTR ) {
>++                continue;
>++            }
>++
>++            res = errno;
>++            close(random_fd);
>++            errno = res;
>++            return -1;
>++        }
>++        else if( res == 0 ) {
>++            close(random_fd);
>++            // no more bytes available? should not happen
>++            errno = EIO;
>++            return -1;
>++        }
>++
>++        filled += res;
>++    }
>++
>++    close(random_fd);
>++
>++    return 0;
>++}
>++
>++#endif // ! defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF)
>++
>++#if !defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
>++#    define TRY_GETRANDOM
>++#endif
>++
>++#ifdef TRY_GETRANDOM
>++
>++/*
>++ * wrapper for the getrandom() syscall which was for a long time implemented
>++ * in the Linux kernel, but not wrapped in glibc
>++ */
>++static int
>++GetRandom ( char *buffer, size_t length )
>++{
>++    int res;
>++    size_t filled = 0;
>++
>++    // larger requests are typically rejected by getentropy() / getrandom()
>++    // because they could block or return partially filled buffers
>++    if( length > 256 )
>++    {
>++        errno = EIO;
>++        return -1;
>++    }
>++
>++    while( filled < length )
>++    {
>++        /*
>++         * glibc does not contain a syscall wrapper for this in older
>++         * versions
>++         */
>++        res = syscall(SYS_getrandom, (char*)buffer + filled, length - filled, 0);
>++
>++        if( res == -1 )
>++        {
>++            if( errno == EINTR ) {
>++                continue;
>++            }
>++
>++            return -1;
>++        }
>++        else if( res == 0 )
>++        {
>++            // no more bytes available? should not happen
>++            errno = EIO;
>++            return -1;
>++        }
>++
>++        filled += res;
>++    }
>++
>++    return 0;
>++}
>++
>++#endif /* TRY_GETRANDOM */
>++
>+ void
>+ GenerateRandomData (int len, char *buf)
>+ {
>+ #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
>+     arc4random_buf(buf, len);
>+ #else
>+-    int fd;
>+-
>+-    fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
>+-    read(fd, buf, len);
>+-    close(fd);
>++    int ret = -1;
>++#ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY
>++    /* use getentropy instead */
>++    ret = getentropy (buf, len);
>++#elif defined(TRY_GETRANDOM)
>++    /* try getrandom() wrapper */
>++    ret = GetRandom(buf, len);
>+ #endif
>++
>++    if( ret == -1 ) {
>++	// fallback to manual reading of /dev/urandom
>++	ret = GetUrandom(buf, len);
>++    }
>++    if( ret == -1 ) {
>++	// no error return possible, rather abort than have security problems
>++	OsAbort();
>++    }
>++#endif // HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
>+ }
>+ 
>+ #endif /* XCSECURITY */
>+Index: xorg-server-1.6.5/include/os.h
>+===================================================================
>+--- xorg-server-1.6.5.orig/include/os.h
>++++ xorg-server-1.6.5/include/os.h
>+@@ -264,6 +264,9 @@ void OsBlockSignals (void);
>+ 
>+ void OsReleaseSignals (void);
>+ 
>++extern _X_EXPORT void
>++OsAbort(void);
>++
>+ #if !defined(WIN32)
>+ extern int System(char *);
>+ extern pointer Popen(char *, char *);
>+Index: xorg-server-1.6.5/os/utils.c
>+===================================================================
>+--- xorg-server-1.6.5.orig/os/utils.c
>++++ xorg-server-1.6.5/os/utils.c
>+@@ -1345,6 +1345,26 @@ OsReleaseSignals (void)
>+ #endif
>+ }
>+ 
>++/*
>++ * Pending signals may interfere with core dumping. Provide a
>++ * mechanism to block signals when aborting.
>++ */
>++
>++void
>++OsAbort(void)
>++{
>++#ifndef __APPLE__
>++    OsBlockSignals();
>++#endif
>++#if !defined(WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
>++    /* abort() raises SIGABRT, so we have to stop handling that to prevent
>++     * recursion
>++     */
>++    OsSignal(SIGABRT, SIG_DFL);
>++#endif
>++    abort();
>++}
>++
>+ #if !defined(WIN32)
>+ /*
>+  * "safer" versions of system(3), popen(3) and pclose(3) which give up
>Index: _link
>===================================================================
>--- _link	(revision 4)
>+++ _link	(working copy)
>@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
>-<link project="SUSE:SLE-11-SP3:Update" baserev="a90f4a3150d53e8974bb50c1598944c6">
>-  <patches>
>-    <branch/>
>-  </patches>
>-</link>
>

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Attachments on bug 1025084: 730759 | 730907 | 731000 | 732617