Attachment 738162 Details for Bug 1055233

[patch] Upstream patch

perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA-openssl-1.1.0-compatibility.patch (text/plain), 6.77 KB, created by Pedro Monreal Gonzalez on 2017-08-24 10:03:05 UTC

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Creator: Pedro Monreal Gonzalez

Created: 2017-08-24 10:03:05 UTC

Size: 6.77 KB

patch

obsolete

>From fdbda9585f5c99670912e5c0517dbc7a9d92c74b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
>Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 19:52:44 +0000
>Subject: [PATCH] libcrypt-openssl-rsa-perl: get it compiled with openssl 1.1.0
>
>Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
>
>Bug: https://rt.cpan.org/Public/Bug/Display.html?id=117481
>Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/828387
>
>---
> RSA.xs | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 150 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/RSA.xs b/RSA.xs
>index de512e7822d0..b384cb0e23a2 100644
>--- a/RSA.xs
>+++ b/RSA.xs
>@@ -47,9 +47,119 @@ void croakSsl(char* p_file, int p_line)
> 
> #define THROW(p_result) if (!(p_result)) { error = 1; goto err; }
> 
>+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
>+
>+static void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
>+                         const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
>+{
>+    if (n != NULL)
>+        *n = r->n;
>+    if (e != NULL)
>+        *e = r->e;
>+    if (d != NULL)
>+        *d = r->d;
>+}
>+
>+static int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
>+{
>+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
>+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
>+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
>+     */
>+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
>+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
>+        return 0;
>+
>+    if (n != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->n);
>+        r->n = n;
>+    }
>+    if (e != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->e);
>+        r->e = e;
>+    }
>+    if (d != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->d);
>+        r->d = d;
>+    }
>+
>+    return 1;
>+}
>+
>+static int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
>+{
>+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
>+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
>+     */
>+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
>+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
>+        return 0;
>+
>+    if (p != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->p);
>+        r->p = p;
>+    }
>+    if (q != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->q);
>+        r->q = q;
>+    }
>+
>+    return 1;
>+}
>+
>+static void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
>+{
>+    if (p != NULL)
>+        *p = r->p;
>+    if (q != NULL)
>+        *q = r->q;
>+}
>+
>+static int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
>+{
>+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
>+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
>+     */
>+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
>+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
>+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
>+        return 0;
>+
>+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
>+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
>+    }
>+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
>+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
>+    }
>+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
>+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
>+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
>+    }
>+
>+    return 1;
>+}
>+
>+static void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
>+                                const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
>+                                const BIGNUM **iqmp)
>+{
>+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
>+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
>+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
>+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
>+    if (iqmp != NULL)
>+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
>+}
>+#endif
>+
> char _is_private(rsaData* p_rsa)
> {
>-    return(p_rsa->rsa->d != NULL);
>+    const BIGNUM *d;
>+
>+    RSA_get0_key(p_rsa->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
>+    return(d != NULL);
> }
> 
> SV* make_rsa_obj(SV* p_proto, RSA* p_rsa)
>@@ -136,7 +246,7 @@ unsigned char* get_message_digest(SV* text_SV, int hash_method)
>     }
> }
> 
>-SV* bn2sv(BIGNUM* p_bn)
>+SV* bn2sv(const BIGNUM* p_bn)
> {
>     return p_bn != NULL
>         ? sv_2mortal(newSViv((IV) BN_dup(p_bn)))
>@@ -297,8 +407,15 @@ generate_key(proto, bitsSV, exponent = 65537)
>     unsigned long exponent;
>   PREINIT:
>     RSA* rsa;
>+    BIGNUM *e;
>   CODE:
>-    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa = RSA_generate_key(SvIV(bitsSV), exponent, NULL, NULL));
>+    e = BN_new();
>+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(e);
>+    rsa = RSA_new();
>+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa);
>+    BN_set_word(e, exponent);
>+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, SvIV(bitsSV), e, NULL));
>+    BN_free(e);
>     RETVAL = make_rsa_obj(proto, rsa);
>   OUTPUT:
>     RETVAL
>@@ -325,10 +442,11 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
>         croak("At least a modulous and public key must be provided");
>     }
>     CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa = RSA_new());
>-    rsa->n = n;
>-    rsa->e = e;
>+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL));
>     if (p || q)
>     {
>+        BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
>+
>         error = 0;
>         THROW(ctx = BN_CTX_new());
>         if (!p)
>@@ -341,8 +459,7 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
>             q = BN_new();
>             THROW(BN_div(q, NULL, n, p, ctx));
>         }
>-        rsa->p = p;
>-        rsa->q = q;
>+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q));
>         THROW(p_minus_1 = BN_new());
>         THROW(BN_sub(p_minus_1, p, BN_value_one()));
>         THROW(q_minus_1 = BN_new());
>@@ -353,13 +470,17 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
>             THROW(BN_mul(d, p_minus_1, q_minus_1, ctx));
>             THROW(BN_mod_inverse(d, e, d, ctx));
>         }
>-        rsa->d = d;
>-        THROW(rsa->dmp1 = BN_new());
>-        THROW(BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, p_minus_1, ctx));
>-        THROW(rsa->dmq1 = BN_new());
>-        THROW(BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, q_minus_1, ctx));
>-        THROW(rsa->iqmp = BN_new());
>-        THROW(BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, q, p, ctx));
>+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d));
>+
>+        THROW(dmp1 = BN_new());
>+        THROW(dmq1 = BN_new());
>+        THROW(iqmp = BN_new());
>+
>+        THROW(BN_mod(dmp1, d, p_minus_1, ctx));
>+        THROW(BN_mod(dmq1, d, q_minus_1, ctx));
>+        THROW(BN_mod_inverse(iqmp, q, p, ctx));
>+
>+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp));
>         THROW(RSA_check_key(rsa) == 1);
>      err:
>         if (p_minus_1) BN_clear_free(p_minus_1);
>@@ -373,7 +494,7 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
>     }
>     else
>     {
>-        rsa->d = d;
>+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d));
>     }
>     RETVAL = make_rsa_obj(proto, rsa);
> }
>@@ -386,15 +507,21 @@ _get_key_parameters(p_rsa)
> PPCODE:
> {
>     RSA* rsa;
>+    const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q;
>+    const BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
>+
>     rsa = p_rsa->rsa;
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->n));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->e));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->d));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->p));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->q));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->dmp1));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->dmq1));
>-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->iqmp));
>+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
>+    RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
>+    RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(n));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(e));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(d));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(p));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(q));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(dmp1));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(dmq1));
>+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(iqmp));
> }
> 
> SV*
>-- 
>2.1.4
>

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Attachments on bug 1055233: 738162